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Abstract
I explore the eﬀect of skill-biased technological change on long-run inequality by building a model
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endogenous. In the model, the existence of unequal steady states does not depend on the degree
of technological skill bias, but on the credit market, the cost of education, and the growth rate
of the economy. However, by building an appropriate measure of inequality, I show that when
unequal steady states exist, economies with a higher technological skill bias have a greater long-
run inequality. Therefore, the impact of skill-biased technological change on inequality may be
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1 Introduction
The evolution of the wage structure in the United States between the end of the 1970s
and the beginning of the 1990s suggests that technology can, in the short run, increase
inequality. During this period, the diﬀerence between the average wage of workers with
a college degree and of workers with a high school degree increased signiﬁcantly. The
reason was the introduction of the personal computer and the unfolding of the information
technology era. This wave of innovations was skill biased : it increased the productivity
of skilled workers (workers with a college degree), leaving unchanged the productivity of
unskilled workers.1
However, the long-run impact of technology on inequality is not well understood. Con-
trary to the short run, in the long-run the supply of skilled workers is endogenous: after
an increase in the skilled wage the number of skilled workers may increase. The possible
reasons are:
• Parents may be willing to spend more on the education of their children when the
return on education is higher.
• Student loans have an implicit collateral: the student's future wage. When the wage
is higher, more people should be able to access the credit market and ﬁnance their
education.
In addition, the short-run cost of education is ﬁxed, but since college professors are skilled
workers the long-run college tuition is likely to be correlated with the skilled wage. Therefore,
the impact of an increase in the skilled wage on the net return of the skilled profession is
ambiguous.
Here I explore the eﬀect of skill-biased technological change on long-run inequality by
building an overlapping generation model that includes the three mechanisms listed above.
The building blocks are:
• Altruistic parents that leave bequests to their children.
• An imperfect credit market where young people can raise resources to ﬁnance their
education.
• An endogenous cost of education.
Note that each of these building blocks introduces a new potential source of inequality:
altruism, credit market imperfections, and the cost of education. One of the goal of the
paper is to compare the impact of skill-bias technological change on long-run inequality with
1 See, among many others, Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce (1993) and Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2005).
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the impact of the institutional factors listed above on lung-run inequality. This comparison
is particularly relevant in light of the existing literature (see the next subsection). Finally,
I will include in the analysis an exogenous productivity growth. The reason is that all
the mechanisms described above are intertemporal (pay for school today to earn a higher
wage tomorrow, borrow today and pay back tomorrow). The increase in productivity across
periods may have important consequences for long-run inequality.
I show that, as typical in this class of models, the set of unequal steady states is a
continuum. More interestingly, here the set of possible steady-state skill premia (the ratio
of skilled and unskilled wage) does not depend on the skill bias of the economy. The existence
of a speciﬁc steady state (equal or unequal) depends on a set of constraints to be satisﬁed.
For example, in an unequal steady state unskilled workers should not be able to borrow,
and the return on the skilled profession should be higher than the return of the unskilled
one. I show that these constraints depend on technology only through the skill premium. In
the long run, the skill premium is a function of the skill bias and of the skilled-to-unskilled
ratio. Therefore, two economies diﬀering only in their skill bias will have diﬀerent steady-
state skilled-to-unskilled ratios so to keep the set of steady-state skill premia constant.
As a consequence, the existence of long-run inequality does not depend on the degree of
technological skill bias. Long-run inequality exists when the credit market does not function
well, when the growth rate of the economy is low, and when education is costly. Whenever
unequal steady states do not exist, the unique steady state is equal: both professions yield
the same return.
This ﬁrst set of results, therefore, is useful when comparing economies with an unknown
initial condition. In this sense, skill-biased technology does not matter because the range
of possible outcomes (measured in terms of skill premium) does not change with skill bias.
However, I also show that if an economy is in an unequal steady state, and this steady state
is in the interior of the unequal steady-states set, it is possible to track the convergence of
this economy to the new steady state after an arbitrarily small change in skill bias. In this
sense, the model allows us to predict what happens to long-run inequality after an increase
in skill bias starting from some speciﬁc initial conditions.
In order to make a meaningful comparison between economies before and after the tech-
nological shock, I build an appropriate measure of long-run inequality that, following Atkin-
son (1970), depends on the whole distribution of steady-state wealth. I show that after an
arbitrarily small increase in skill bias, the long-run skill premium and the long-run inequality
both increase. This is true in every steady state except for a zero-measure set. Therefore,
in general, short-run inequality and long-run inequality move in the same direction. This
implies that the impact of technology on inequality may be permanent: today's inequality
may depend on the introduction of the personal computer 30 years ago.
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1.1 Relation With the Existing Literature
The existing literature exploring the causes of economic inequality can be roughly divided
into two school of thoughts: the one focusing on technology, and the one focusing on institu-
tions like the credit market or the educational sector. The ﬁrst one originated with Kuznets
(1955), who introduced the idea that there exists an inverse-U-shaped relationship between
inequality and economic growth. During early stages of development (when, for example,
only the traditional agricultural sector exists) we should observe low levels of inequality,
when economic development starts (an industrial sector appears next to the agricultural
one) inequality should increase, and, ﬁnally, when an economy becomes fully developed (the
main sector is the industrial one) inequality should decline again. Therefore technology can
cause inequality in the short run because the supply of diﬀerent types of workers does not
adjust immediately (in Kuznets's model, this happen because people need to move from the
countryside - where agricultural production occurs - to cities - where industrial production
occurs). The second school of thought has its origin with Banerjee and Newman (1993)
and Galor and Zeira (1993). These authors showed that, whenever there are credit market
imperfections, inequality in the distribution of wealth can persist in the long run. Credit
market imperfection creates a non convexity in the investment opportunity: only agents
with wealth above a certain level can become entrepreneurs. This non convexity constraints
the supply of diﬀerent types of workers and therefore allows inequality to be persistent.
The debate between these two approaches is nicely summarized in Piketty (2006):
[...] the impact of technology on inequality depends on a large number of
institutions, and these institutions vary a great deal over time and across coun-
tries. Chief among these are the institutions governing the supply and structure
of skills, from formal schooling institutions to on-the-job training schemes. To
a large extent, the dynamics of labor market inequality are determined by the
race between the demand for skills and the supply of skills. New technologies
tend to raise the demand for skills, but the impact on inequality depends as to
whether the supply of skills is rising at a faster or lower rate. There is no general
presumption that the race should go one way or the other.
My paper builds a bridge between these two school of thoughts and aims at determining
how this race between demand of skills (determined by technology) and supply of skills
(determined by institution) goes in the long run. I show that institutions are the main
determinants of long-run inequality, in the sense that inequality exists only if some form
of non convexity in the investment opportunities exists; the origin of non convexities are
in the credit market and in the educational sector. However, if a non convexity exists the
supply of skills is constrained and skill-bias technology does increase inequality. Skill-bias
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technology matters, but it is a second order determinant of long-run inequality.
The only other paper exploring the long-run impact of skill-bias technological change is
Rigolini (2004). The author develops a model where the cost of education is endogenous
and depends on the skilled wage. He shows that an increase in the growth rate of the
economy may increase or decrease the incentive for unskilled workers to acquire education,
measured as the utility diﬀerence between an unskilled agent that remains unskilled and an
unskilled agent that decides to become skilled. In his model, a higher growth rate increases
the cost (to be paid upfront) as well as the return (to be enjoyed in the future) of education.
Depending on the utility function and the discount factor, education may become more or
less worthwhile. He then claims that the same result applies with respect to skill biased
technological change. I show that Rigolini's intuition is incorrect. The diﬀerence between
an increase in skill bias and an increase in the growth rate is that skill bias also makes
unskilled workers poorer relative to skilled workers. As a result, the impact of an increase
in skill bias does not depend on the parameters of the utility function.
In the next section I illustrate the model. In the third section I derive the steady state
of the economy. I build a measure of inequality in the fourth section. I derive the dynamics
and compare steady states before and after a skill-biased technological shock in the ﬁfth
section. Finally, in the last section I conclude with a brief summary of my main results.
2 The Model
A small open economy is composed of a measure one of agents, all identical but starting
their lives with diﬀerent levels of wealth.
2.1 The Households.
Each individual is alive for two periods. During the ﬁrst one, she receives a bequest from
her parent and decides whether to get an education or not. If she chooses to go to school,
she'll be a skilled type; otherwise she'll be an unskilled type. In the second period she works,
earns a wage, consumes and bequeaths to her only child (see ﬁgure 1). The end-of-life utility
of an agent active at time t depends on her own consumption as well as on the wealth of
her child.2 Deﬁne wst and w
u
t as the wage of a skilled and of an unskilled worker active in
period t. Deﬁne eit as the bequest made by the member of household i active in period t− 1
(agent {i, t−1}) to the one active in period t (agent {i, t}). Deﬁne the total wealth of agent
2 This form of altruism is called paternalistic altruism. It implies that parents care about their direct
oﬀspring but not about distant generations. For details, see Mookherjee and Ray (2006).
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Fig. 1: Timeline
{i, t} as the sum of the resources available to her before consuming and bequeathing:
mit =
(eit − ξt−1)(1 + r) + wst if {i, t} is high skilledeit(1 + r) + wut if {i, t} is low skilled
where ξt−1 is the cost of eduction in period t− 1. It follows that a parent's utility is given
by:
U it = u(c
i
t) + βv(m
i
t+1) (1)
I assume that both functions u(.) and v(.) are identical CRRA:
U it =
(
cit
)1−σ
1− σ + β
(
mit+1
)1−σ
1− σ
As already mentioned in the introduction, the cost of education is endogenous. Children
can become unskilled workers for free, but becoming a skilled worker is costly. In each period
some skilled workers are employed as teachers, and each teaches to 1λ number of students.
Therefore the cost of education is given by ξt−1 = λwst−1.
In order to ﬁnance their education, people can borrow on the capital market using the
bequest received and their future wage as collateral. However, in case they do not pay back,
they will lose only a fraction 1− θ of their total wealth. Thus, they are not fully liable. If a
young individual goes to school without borrowing, or if she borrows and repays her loan,
her budget constraint is:
cit + e
i
t+1 = w
s
t + (e
i
t − λwst−1)(1 + r) (2)
If she borrows for school and does not repay, her budget constraint is:
cit + e
i
t+1 = θw
s
t (3)
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If she does not go to school, her budget constraint is:
cit + e
i
t+1 = w
u
t + e
i
t(1 + r) (4)
Given this, banks will lend to agents only if the RHS of 2 is greater than the RHS of 3: access
to the credit market and to school is determined by the bequest received at the beginning
of life. More precisely, people can become skilled if:
et ≥ λwst−1 − wst
(
1− θ
1 + r
)
(5)
Note that, although the parameter θ is taken as given, the existence of credit rationing
in the economy is determined endogenously. An economy with very severe credit constraints
in some periods could evolve toward a perfect credit market. Similarly, an economy with a
perfect credit market could later on develop some imperfections. Since inequality and credit
market imperfections are strictly interconnected, most of the analysis that follows will focus
on the long run evolution of equation 5.
Given the utility function and the budget constraint, it is possible to derive the ﬁrst
order conditions. In principle, there are several diﬀerent cases, depending on the profession
of the parent and on the profession of the child. However, the ﬁrst order conditions that
will be relevant in steady state are: skilled parents with skilled son, interior solution:
ei,st+1 =
1
ρ(1 + r) + 1
(
(eit − λwst−1)(1 + r) + wst (1 + ρ(1 + r)λ)− ρwst+1
)
(6)
skilled parents with skilled son, corner solution:
ei,st+1 = max
{
λwst − wst+1
(
1− θ
1 + r
)
, 0
}
(7)
unskilled parent with unskilled son, interior solution:
ei,ut+1 =
1
ρ(1 + r) + 1
(
eit(1 + r) + w
u
t − ρwut+1
)
(8)
and unskilled parent with unskilled son, corner solution:
ei,ut+1 = 0 (9)
where ρ ≡ [β (1 + r)]− 1σ .
Finally, I will show in the next section that, under fairly weak assumptions, both profes-
sions are always employed in production. This implies that becoming a skilled worker must
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always be at least as proﬁtable as becoming an unskilled worker. In other words, the RHS
of 2 is always greater or equal than the RHS of 4:
wst − λwst−1(1 + r) ≥ wut (10)
2.2 The Production Function.
The ﬁnal good is produced according to the following function:
Yt = K
α
t (atS

t + btU

t )
1−α
 (11)
where K is capital, S and U are skilled and unskilled workers employed in production, and
at and bt represent the productivity of the two types of workers. If both at and bt change by
the same amount, this translates into a change in the overall productivity on the economy.
Instead, variations to atbt reﬂect variations in the skill bias of the economy.
Markets are competitive and all inputs receive their marginal product:
r =
∂Yt
∂kt
= α
(
(atS

t + btU

t )
1

Kt
)1−α
(12)
wst =
∂Yt
∂St
= Kαt (1− α)(atSt + btU t )
1−α
 −1atS−1t (13)
wut =
∂Yt
∂Ut
= Kαt (1− α)(atSt + btU t )
1−α
 −1btU −1t (14)
I assume that  < 1. Under this condition the marginal product of labor at zero is
inﬁnity: no matter how high wages are, ﬁrms will always demand a strictly positive amount
of each type of labor. Note that if  ≤ 0 no production can occur unless all inputs are used.
If instead 0 <  < 1 production can, in principle, occur using only one type of workers.
Finally, whenever 1 − α >  the two types of workers are complements, while if 1 − α < 
they are substitutes.
Consistent with the literature, let's call the ratio of the two wages skill premium:
wst
wut
=
at
bt
(
Ut
St
)1−
(15)
2.3 Market Clearing Conditions.
I assume that the economy is small and that it can freely borrow and lend on the international
capital market. Under these assumptions, the domestic market clearing interest rate is equal
to the international one, and the capital market is always in equilibrium. In addition, by
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Walras' law I can ignore the consumption good's market. It follows that the economy is in
equilibrium if the two labor markets and the education market clear.
The demand for skilled and unskilled workers is given by equations 13 and 14. The supply
depends on whether the returns on the two professions are equal or not. If agents prefer
to be skilled, the supply of skilled workers is given by the number of workers with wealth
satisfying condition 5. If instead they are indiﬀerent, any agents with wealth satisfying
condition 5 can be either skilled or unskilled.
Proposition 1. Deﬁne Ft(e) as the c.d.f of the wealth distribution across the generation
active at period t. Whenever
wst − λwst−1(1 + r) > wut (16)
labor market clears if
Ut = Ft
(
λwst−1 −
wst (1− θ)
(1 + r)
)
(17)
1 = Ut + St + λSt+1 (18)
and equations 13 and 14 hold. If instead
wst − λwst−1(1 + r) = wut (19)
The labor market clears if there exists a measure µ such that
Ut = Ft
(
λwst−1 −
wst (1− θ)
(1 + r)
)
+ µ (20)
1 = Ut + St + λSt+1
where 0 ≤ µ ≤ 1− Ft
(
λwst−1 − w
s
t (1−θ)
(1+r)
)
and, again, 13 and 14 are satisﬁed.
Finally, in a competitive equilibrium, the education market clears as well. Using the ﬁrst
order conditions of the production sector, it is possible to write
wst = aχ
(
a+ b
(
Ut
St
)) 1−1
where
χ =
(α
r
) α
1−α
(1− α)
In other words, the labor-market clearing wage uniquely determines the skilled-to-unskilled
ratio in period t. Call Tt−1 the stock of teachers available in period t − 1. The stock of
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skilled workers in period t is predetermined and equal to Tt−1λ . Some of these skilled workers
will work in production and other will work as teachers.
Proposition 2. In period t, the education market clears if:
St
Ut
≤
Tt−1
λ
1− Tt−1λ
(21)
Nothing guarantees that condition 21 holds at the wages that clear the labor market.
However, in the appendix I show that if a competitive equilibrium exists in period t+ 1, a
unique competitive equilibrium exists in period t. This is enough to deﬁne a steady state in
the usual way.
3 Steady State
Let's assume that the productivity parameters at and bt grow at the common constant rate
g.
Deﬁnition 3. The economy is in a steady state if the number of each type of workers
is constant, and aggregate output, aggregate capital, wages, and consumption grow at a
constant rate.
Deﬁnition 4. A steady state is equal if the returns on the two profession are equal. A
steady state is unequal if the two professions yield diﬀerent returns.
Since a steady state must also be a competitive equilibrium, it is quite straightforward
to see that in an unequal steady state the following properties must hold:
• The return on the skilled profession is higher than the return on the unskilled profes-
sion.
• Unskilled workers do not have access to credit (no-credit constraint).
• Either unskilled workers do not want to bequeath enough so that their children can
become skilled (no-deviation constraint), or it is impossible for them to do so (no-
negative-consumption constraint).
Lemma 5. In an unequal steady state the descendant of a skilled worker will be skilled, and
the descendant of an unskilled worker will be unskilled.
In other words, in a steady state each child inherits the profession of his parent,3 and the
economy is populated by skilled households and unskilled households.
3 I assume, without loss of generality, that this is also the case when the two professions yield the same
return.
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Lemma 6. Assume that at and bt grow at a constant rate g. In a steady state, consumption,
bequests, wages, and capital grow at a gross rate:
γ ≡ 1 + g
Using lemma 5 and lemma 6, I can rewrite the ﬁrst order conditions 6, 7, 8, and 9 as:
est+1,ss = w
s
t,ssmax
{
(1− ργ)(γ − λ(1 + r))
γ − (1 + r)(1− ργ) , λ−
γ(1− θ)
1 + r
, 0
}
(22)
and
eut+1,ss = w
u
t,ssmax
{
γ(1− ργ)
γ − (1 + r)(1− ργ) , 0
}
(23)
In order to guarantee the existence of a steady state, I need to impose some restrictions
on the parameters.
Assumption 7. The net return on the skilled profession is positive:
γ > λ(1 + r) (24)
Assumption 7 is equivalent to
wst+1,ss
1 + r
> λwst,ss
where the RHS is the cost of education in a steady state, and the LHS is the skilled wage
discounted by one period. This assumption implies that, in order for a steady state to exist,
the cost of education shouldn't be too high.
Note that assumption 7 would not be necessary if the cost of education were ﬁxed, as
in Mookherjee and Ray (2006). In that case, the skilled wage always adjusts in order to
persuade some people to get educated. Here, instead, the steady-state cost of education is
endogenous: whether the return on the skilled profession is positive does not depend on the
skilled wage but on condition 24.
Proposition 8. Under assumption 7, if the credit market works well enough
θ < 1− λ(1 + r)
γ
the economy has a unique steady state that is equal.
Proposition 8 is quite intuitive. When it holds, in a steady state everybody is able to
borrow and pay for education, even if they have zero wealth. It follows that the only possible
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Only unequal steady states
Unique equal steady state
Both equal and unequal steady states
Credit rationing possible
θ < 1− λ(1+r)
γ
θ > 1− λ(1+r)
γ
Perfect credit market
Condition 25 holds
Condition 25 does not hold
Fig. 2: Steady states.
steady state is the equal one.
Proposition 9. Assume the that credit market is imperfect:
θ > 1− λ(1 + r)
γ
Under assumption 7, if
1 + r − γ
1 + r
< γρ < 1 (25)
then the economy has a continuum of unequal steady states and one equal steady state.
Otherwise, the economy has a continuum of unequal steady states, but no equal steady state.
The proof of proposition 9 shows that, when credit market is imperfect, there are always
steady states where unskilled agents are too poor to borrow and too poor to leave bequests
high enough to allow their children to access education. Note that proposition 9 is consistent
with Mookherjee and Ray (2006) who ﬁnd, in a model where there is no credit market, that
unequal steady states always exist but the economy may or may not have an equal steady
state.
The role of condition 25 is the following. When it holds, the agents' optimization problem
has an interior solution, in the sense that the optimal bequest level is computed using
the ﬁrst order conditions. In other words, unskilled parents leave positive bequests and
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skilled parents leave bequests strictly greater than the one necessary for their children to
access education. Using Mookherjee and Ray (2006) framework, one could say that parents
leave both an educational bequest and a ﬁnancial bequest. This implies that, if the returns
on the two professions are equal, both types of workers bequeath the same amount, and
equality is possible in steady state. If instead condition 25 does not hold, the agents'
optimization problem has a corner solution where skilled workers bequeath just enough so
that their children can go to school, and unskilled workers do not leave any bequest (again,
one could say that parents leave only educational bequests). In this case there cannot be an
equal steady state, since a skilled parent would be better oﬀ by switching to zero bequest,
increasing their own consumption, and leaving his child income unchanged (but forcing him
to be unskilled).4 Therefore condition 25 is similar to what Mookherjee and Ray (2006) call
widespan condition.
Proposition 9 delivers the ﬁrst result of the paper. It shows that skill-biased technology
has nothing to do with the existence of long-run inequality. Quite intuitively, unequal steady
states exist if:
• The credit market functions poorly (high θ).
• The growth rate of the economy γ is low.
• The interest rate r is high.
• The cost of education λ is high.
Therefore, any impact that skill-biased technology may have on inequality is of secondary
order: it is relevant only if the other parameters are such that there is inequality in the ﬁrst
place.
Proposition 10. The set of steady state skill premia does not depend on ab .
The proof of proposition 10 shows that each of the constraints characterizing an unequal
steady state deﬁnes a set of skill premia. The reason is that the steady-state cost of educa-
tion, the steady-state access to credit, and the steady-state bequests are all linear functions
of wages. It follows, quite intuitively, that whether education is desirable, whether it is
possible to send children to school, or whether it is possible to access credit depends on the
skill premium. Since technology aﬀects the constraints only through the skill premium, the
steady-state skill premia are independent on the skill bias. Figure 3 depicts one possible
set of unequal steady states. When skill bias increases, the points A, B, and C shift to
4 One of the nice technical features of the model is that, in steady state, whether there is a corner solution
or not is independent on the wage level. This also implies that either both types of workers face a corner
solution or neither of them.
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Fig. 3: Unequal steady states.
the right and the distance between A and B, and B and C expand, so as to keep the skill
premium at the four points constant. Similarly, when skill bias decreases, the set of unequal
steady states shrinks. If inequality exists, changing ab will change the shape of the unequal
steady-states set, but the unequal steady-states set will continue to exist.
Proposition 10 contradicts one of Rigolini's claims. In a model with a continuum of
occupations, he shows that the only unequal steady state is the one where parents are
indiﬀerent between educating their children or not (as in point B of ﬁgure 3). He shows
that, after an increase in the overall growth rate of the economy, the steady state skill
premium may increase or decrease, depending on the parameters of the utility function.
The reason is that the return on education is higher: whether the demand for education
increases or not depends on the strength of the income and substitution eﬀects. He then
claims that the same holds true for a skill-biased technological change.
Rigolini's claim is not correct because skill-biased technological change has an additional
eﬀect on the wealth of unskilled workers. Unskilled parents do not want to leave a bequest
that is high enough to allow their children can go to school if
U(eut,ss(1 + r) + w
u
t,ss − eut+1,ss) + βU(eut+1,ss(1 + r) + wut+1,ss) ≥
U(eut,ss(1 + r) + w
u
t,ss − e?t+1,ss) + βU(wst+1,ss)
where
e?t+1 = w
s
t+1,ss
(
λ− (1− θ)γ
1 + r
)
is the amount of wealth a young agents needs to access education. The above expression
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can be rewritten as
T ≥ 1
1− σ
[(
R(1 + r) + 1− w
sγ
wu
O
)1−σ
+ β
(
γws
wu
)1−σ]
(26)
where
R = max
{
γ(1− ργ)
γ − (1 + r)(1− ργ) , 0
}
O = λ− (1− θ)γ
1 + r
T =
1
1− σ
[
((1 + r − γ)R+ 1)1−σ + β ((1 + r)γR+ 1)1−σ
]
Therefore, the constraint depends on skill bias only through the skill premium. Also,
the RHS of inequality 26 is strictly concave in w
s
wu : the constraint is satisﬁed for higher skill
premium and lower skill premium. It follows that an increase in the skill premium decreases
the incentive to acquire education for low SU and increases it for high
S
U .
4 Inequality
Most of the papers dealing with skill-biased technological change use skill premium as a
measure for inequality. However, the features of this model make skill premium a bad proxy
for long-run inequality. For example, the cost of education is endogenous: if skill premium
goes up, but so does the cost of education, can we say that the economy is less equal? Skilled
workers will earn more but will pay more for becoming skilled workers. They may not gain
anything.
I build a measure of inequality based on Atkinson (1970). For a given social welfare
function W , deﬁne xeqW as the wealth level that, if equally distributed across all agents,
would achieve the current social welfare. Inequality can be measured as
µ = 1− x
eq
W
E(x)
(27)
where E(x) is the average wealth in a given time period. This measure is always between
zero and one, and it's exactly zero when wealth is constant across agents. Furthermore, it
is invariant with respect to shifts in the average wealth. The interpretation of this measure
is as follows: if µ = 0.7, by distributing wealth equally we could achieve the very same level
of social welfare, saving 70% of the current average wealth.
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Finally, I specify a particular social welfare function. I use a Rawlsian criterion:
W = miniU(x
i) (28)
This way, inequality measures the amount of wealth relative to the average wealth a social
planner can collect if he expropriates the surplus of everybody who owns more than the
poorest agent in the economy.
Lemma 11. In steady state, inequality is given by:
µ
(
U
S
)
=

(1+λ)
[
a
b (
U
S )
1−
(1− (1+r)λγ )−1
]
(1+λ) ab (
U
S )
1−
(1− (1+r)λγ )+US
if 1+r−γ1+r < γρ < 1
(1+λ)
[
a
b (
U
S )
1−
(1+ (1+r)λ(γ−1)γ −γ(1−θ))−1
]
(1+λ) ab (
U
S )
1−
(1+ (1+r)λ(γ−1)γ −γ(1−θ))+US
otherwise
(29)
For future reference, note that whenever I compare inequality across steady states with
the same SU the use of a Rawlsian social welfare function is without loss of generality.
Following Atkinson's intuition, the distribution of wealth can be seen as a lottery, and the
measure of inequality can be seen as a normalized risk premium. Using the inequality
measure to compare steady states having the same number of skilled and unskilled workers
but with diﬀerent wealth distributions is equivalent to comparing lotteries with two possible
outcomes, where the probability of each outcome stays constant but the particular realization
varies. Since the normalized risk premium and the inequality measure are invariant to shifts
in the mean of the distribution, this is simply a mean-preserving spread. Whereas any risk
averse agent has the same preference ranking over all the mean preserving spreads of a given
distribution, any concave social welfare function delivers the same ranking of steady states
in terms of inequality. However, when using the inequality measure to compare steady states
with diﬀerent skilled-to-unskilled ratios, the results will be speciﬁc to the Rawlsian criterion
and may not generalize to other social welfare functions.
5 Stability
In models with a continuum of steady states, it is usually very diﬃcult to determine what
initial conditions lead to a particular steady state. This is why most of the analysis is
typically done in terms of set of steady-state inequality levels or steady-state skill premia.
Intuitively, if the set of steady-state inequality levels increases with a parameter, for an
unknown initial condition the probability of converging to a more unequal steady state
increases as well.
Luckily, here it is possible to derive the dynamics of the economy for some speciﬁc initial
conditions.
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Proposition 12. Consider an economy in a steady state having a skilled-to-unskilled ratio
p. If p is in the interior of the set of unequal steady states, after a shock the economy will
converge again to p.
A shock is, by deﬁnition, an arbitrarily small variation to one of the parameters of the
economy. If the variation is very small, and p is in the interior, p remains a steady state.
The intuition behind proposition 12 is that, after a shock, unskilled workers remain credit
constrained. It follows that the number of skilled and unskilled workers remains constant
along the transition to the new steady state. Therefore, the economy can only converge
back to p.
Proposition 13. Consider an economy in an unequal steady state. Assume that its skilled-
to-unskilled ratio is in the interior of the set of unequal steady states. After an arbitrarily
small increase in skill bias, this economy converges to a steady state where skill premium
and inequality are higher than before. Similarly, after an arbitrary decrease in skill bias,
this economy converges to a steady state where skill premium and inequality are lower.
Intuitively, keeping SU ﬁxed, inequality increases when skill bias (and, therefore, skill
premium) increases. The steady state wealth is a linear function of the wages of skilled and
unskilled workers, and skill bias matters only through the wages. Relative wealth depends
on skill bias only through the skill premium, exactly like in the short run case.
Therefore, for the steady states where it is possible to derive the dynamics, skill bias and
inequality move together. In addition, if we limit to arbitrarily small increase in skill bias,
the only point that is not a steady state anymore after a shock is point B in ﬁgure 3 (if it
exists). For all the other unequal steady states, proposition 13 holds. Finally, note that this
result does not depend on the particular social welfare function chosen, since, as discussed
on the preceding page, we are comparing inequality levels across economies having the same
S
U .
What happen after ab increases when an economy is at point B in ﬁgure 3? My conjecture
is that the economy will converge to a new steady state B' having the same skill premium
but more skilled workers than B. Note that, before the shock, at point B unskilled parents
are indiﬀerent between sending their children to school or not. After the shock, they strictly
prefer to purchase education. Some unskilled workers become skilled until the skill premium
returns to the original one. At this point, unskilled workers are, again, indiﬀerent between
purchasing education or not. When keeping skill premium constant, inequality increases
if the number of skilled workers increases. This implies that, if the conjecture is correct,
inequality increases following an increase in the skill bias in this case too. However, it
is important to remember that the result depends on the speciﬁc social welfare function
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chosen. Since a Rawlsian criterion is a special case, even if the conjecture is correct this
result is somehow fragile.
Given the fact that the economy has a continuum of unequal steady states, what happens
at point B may seem almost irrelevant. However, in models with an exogenous cost of
education by introducing a continuum of occupations (as in Mookherjee and Ray (2006)),
or random ability shocks (as in Mookherjee and Napel (2007)), or diﬀerent fertility rates
(as in Mookherjee, Prina, and Ray (2009)), the surviving unequal steady states are the
ones where unskilled agents are indiﬀerent between purchasing education or not, exactly
like at B. In light of these other works, it is important to fully understand what happens
to inequality at point B, using a general class of social welfare functions. Answering this
question is left for future work.
6 Conclusion
There is convincing evidence showing that, in the short run, skill-biased technological change
can increase inequality. However, very little is known about its long-run eﬀect. My paper
aims at ﬁlling this gap.
I build an OLG model with several potential sources of inequality: skill-biased tech-
nology, imperfect credit market, exogenous productivity growth, altruism, and education
technology. I show that long-run inequality exists if the credit market functions poorly,
productivity growth is low, altruism is low, or the education technology is ineﬃcient. Sur-
prisingly, the existence of long-run inequality does not depend on the degree of skill bias of
the economy.
Whether the degree of skill bias is important in determining the long-run inequality level
depends on how inequality is measured. I build a measure of inequality based on Atkinson
(1970) and I show that, if inequality exists, after an increase in skill bias almost all the
economies will converge to steady states with a higher skill premium and higher inequality.
Therefore, short-run and long-run inequality move in the same direction. This result shows
that the introduction of a skill biased technological innovation decades ago such as the
computer may partly be responsible for today's inequality.
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A Proofs of section 2.
A.1 Existence of the competitive equilibrium solving backward.
Consider a given sequence of bequests distributions {Ft(e)}∞t=1. Suppose that at time t+ 1
there exists a competitive equilibrium. In other words, take the wages wst+1 and w
u
t+1, the
number of teachers in period t + 1 as given. I will show that there exists a competitive
equilibrium in period t, therefore the problem can always be solved backward.
In every period, wages are fully determined by the skilled-to-unskilled ratio. Using the
ﬁrst order conditions of the production sector, it is possible to write
wst = aχ
(
a+ b
(
Ut
St
)) 1−1
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where
χ =
(α
r
) α
1−α
(1− α)
This implies two things:
• wst+1 and the number of teachers in period t + 1 uniquely determines the number of
skilled and unskilled workers in period t+ 1.
• StUt uniquely determines wst and, therefore, the cost of education for the generation
active in period t+ 1 (i.e. the generation that is young in period t).
Choose StUt such that the number of agents with access to the credit market is exactly equal
to the number of skilled workers in period t+ 1. This is an equilibrium if the return on the
skilled profession is greater than the return on the unskilled one in period t+ 1
wst ≤
1
λ(1 + r)
(wst+1 − wut+1)
If the above condition is not satisﬁed, choose a StUt such that
wst =
1
λ(1 + r)
(wst+1 − wut+1)
In this case, the number of agents with access to the credit market is higher than the number
of skilled agents in period t + 1. However, agents are indiﬀerent between becoming skilled
workers or unskilled workers: I can assume that exactly St+1+
1
λSt+2 agents become skilled.
Finally, the number of teachers in period t is given by the number of skilled workers in period
t+ 1.
Note that the above argument may not work if the distribution Ft+1(e) is discontinuous.
Suppose that there is a positive measure of agents receiving a particular bequest level e.
Imagine that when wst is such that
e = λwst −
wst+1(1− θ)
(1 + r)
too many people have access to the credit market:
Ut+1 < Ft+1
(
λwst −
wst+1(1− θ)
(1 + r)
)
but if wst is such that
e > λwst −
wst+1(1− θ)
(1 + r)
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too few people have access to the credit market:
Ut+1 > Ft+1
(
λwst −
wst+1(1− θ)
(1 + r)
)
In this situation, for a competitive equilibrium to exist I need to introduce a tie breaking
rule. Note that when
e = λwst −
wst+1(1− θ)
(1 + r)
banks are indiﬀerent about lending to agents with wealth e. I assume that the banking
sector will lend only to some of the agents with wealth equal to e. The fraction receiving a
loan is such that the number of unskilled workers next period is equal to Ut+1. This way,
if a competitive equilibrium exists in period t + 1, a competitive equilibrium exists also in
period t, no matter the distribution of wealth.
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B.1 Proof of lemma 5.
Since the total number of skilled and unskilled workers is a constant in steady state, there
can be social mobility only if two households swap occupations. Suppose that there is one
household with a skilled father and an unskilled son, and another household with a unskilled
father and a skilled son. Since agents prefer to be skilled, it must be the case that the son
of the unskilled worker has access to the credit market and the son of the skilled worker
does not. This implies that the unskilled father must be wealthier than the skilled father,
leading to a contradiction: if the unskilled father had access to the credit market he would
have chosen the skilled profession.
B.2 Proof of lemma 6.
Consider equation 12 in steady state at time t. Take the log of both sides and subtract the
log of the same equation in t+ 1. The gross growth rate of capital is given by:
γ = 1 + g
Similarly, using equations 13 and 14, wages grow at the same rate γ. Finally, consider the
budget constraint of an unskilled agent in a steady state, in period t:
et+1,ss + ct,ss = wt,ss + et,ss(1 + r)
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divide and multiply each element by itself one period earlier:
et,ssγe + ct−1,ssγc = wt−1,ssγ + et−1,ss(1 + r)γe
Since the budget constraint must also hold in period t− 1:
et,ss + ct−1,ss = wt−1,ss + et−1,ss(1 + r)
it must be the case that γ = γc = γe.
B.3 Proof of propositions 8, 9 and 10.
Lemma 14. Under assumption 7, if condition 25 holds, agents are unconstrained:
est+1,ss = w
s
t,ss
(1− ργ)(γ − λ(1 + r))
γ − (1 + r)(1− ργ)
eut+1,ss = w
u
t,ss
γ(1− ργ)
γ − (1 + r)(1− ργ)
Otherwise, the constraints are binding:
est+1,ss = w
s
t,ssmax
{
λ− γ(1− θ)
1 + r
, 0
}
eut+1,ss = 0
Proof. Skilled workers are unconstrained when
λ− γ(1− θ)
1 + r
<
(1− ργ)(γ − λ(1 + r))
γ − (1 + r)(1− ργ)
or
θ <
(
(1− ργ)(γ − λ(1 + r))
γ − (1 + r)(1− ργ)
)
(1 + r)
γ
+ 1
by assumptions 7, when condition 25 holds the LHS is greater than one and the inequality
holds. Finally, for unskilled workers the conclusion follows simply by condition 25.
B.3.1 Proposition 8.
It follows simply because if
θ < 1− λ(1 + r)
γ
everybody can borrow.
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B.3.2 Proposition 9.
Assume that credit market is imperfect:
θ > 1− λ(1 + r)
γ
• Case 1: agents are unconstrained (condition 25 holds).
There is an equal steady state if the returns on the two professions is equal:
1− λ(1 + r)
γ
=
wu
ws
(30)
There is an unequal steady state if the two professions yield diﬀerent returns:
wu
ws
< 1− λ(1 + r)
γ
unskilled workers cannot access the credit market:
wu
ws
<
(
λ− (1− θ)γ
1 + r
)(
γ − (1 + r)(1− ργ)
γ(1− ργ)
)
and the no-negative-consumption constraint holds:
wu
ws
1
γ
<
(
λ− (1− θ)γ
1 + r
)(
γ − (1 + r)(1− ργ)
(γ − 1)(1− ργ)(1 + r) + γ
)
Because of assumption 7, if the credit market is imperfect, there is always some SU that
satisﬁes the three inequalities above. However, note that the above constraints do not deﬁne
the set of unequal steady states. The extra constraint missing is the no-deviation constraint:
parents should not want to bequeath enough so that their children cannot go to school,
whenever this deviation is possible. However, if a w
u
ws satisﬁes all the above constraints, this
wu
ws is an unequal steady state, since the no-negative-consumption constraints requires such
deviation not to be feasible.
• Case 2: agents are constrained (condition 25 does not hold).
Unskilled agents bequeath zero wealth and are not able to borrow: the no-credit constraint
is always satisﬁed. Note that there cannot be an equal steady state. This would correspond
to a situation where skilled workers bequeath just enough so that their children can to go
to school and unskilled workers leave no bequests. In this situation, if the returns on the
two professions are equal, skilled parents prefer to leave zero wealth: they can increase their
own consumption leaving their children income unchanged.
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There is an unequal steady state if the return on one profession is strictly bigger that
the return on the other one:
wu
ws
< 1− λ(1 + r)
γ
and unskilled workers cannot bequeath enough so that their children can go to school:
wu
ws
1
γ
< 1− λ(1 + r)
γ
Note that by assumption 7, if credit market is imperfect and agents are constrained, there
is always some SU that satisﬁes both conditions. This
S
U is an unequal steady state.
B.3.3 Proof of proposition 10.
All the constraints relevant in an unequal steady state have already been derived in the
proof of proposition 9, except for the no-deviation constraint that is discussed in the main
text on page 14. All of them are a function of skill bias only through the skill premium.
It is interesting to note here that the set of skill premia satisfying the no-deviation
constraint has the shape (0, x′] ∪ [x′′, x′′′], while the set of skill premia satisfying the other
constraints has shape (0, x]. This implies that the set of unequal steady state that is between
B and C in ﬁgure 3 may not exist.
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C.1 Proof of lemma 11.
The result follows from simple, but tedious, manipulations. By deﬁnition:
µ =
S(1 + λ)
[
(eSt,ss − λwSt−1,ss)(1 + r) + wSt,ss − eut,ss(1 + r)− wut,ss
]
S(1 + λ)((est,ss − λwst−1,ss)(1 + r) + wst,ss) + U(eut,ss(1 + r) + wu)
write wst−1,ss =
wst,ss
γ and e
i
t,ss =
eit+1,ss
γ for i = s, u. Assume that condition 25 holds and
plug in the ﬁrst order conditions 22 and 23 (using the fact that agents are unconstrained):
µ =
S(1 + λ)
[
wst,ss
(
A(γ − λ(1 + r)) (1+r)γ − λ(1+r)γ + 1
)
− wut,ss (A(1 + r) + 1)
]
S(1 + λ)wst,ss
(
A(γ − λ(1 + r)) (1+r)γ − λ(1+r)γ + 1
)
+ Uwut,ss (A(1 + r) + 1)
where
A =
(1− ργ)
γ − (1 + r)(1− ργ)
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Simplify the expression dividing both numerator and denominator by wu (A(1 + r) + 1):
µ =
(1 + λ)
[
ws
wu
(
1−
Aλ(1+r)2
γ +
λ(1+r)
γ
A(1+r)+1
)
− 1
]
(1 + λ)w
s
wu
(
1−
Aλ(1+r)2
γ +
λ(1+r)
γ
A(1+r)+1
)
+ US
and note that Aλ(1+r)
2
γ +
λ(1+r)
γ = (A(1 + r) + 1)
(
(1+r)λ
γ
)
.
In case condition 25 does not hold following the same steps, the solution is:
µ =
(1 + λ)
[
ws
wu
(
1 + λ(1 + r)
(
1− 1γ
)
− γ(1− θ)
)
− 1
]
(1 + λ)w
s
wu
(
1 + λ(1 + r)
(
1− 1γ
)
− γ(1− θ)
)
+ US
D Proofs of section 5.
D.1 Proof of proposition 12.
If the shock is small, unskilled workers will be unable to borrow also after the shock. For
as long as unskilled workers cannot borrow, wages remain constant at their post-shock level
and bequests converge monotonically to the steady state bequests corresponding to the same
m and the new parameters. Since in the new steady state they cannot borrow, and because
the convergence is monotonic, there was no moment during the transition when unskilled
workers had access to the credit market. The economy must converge to the steady state
corresponding to the new parameters and the old m.
D.2 Proof of proposition 13.
Diﬀerentiating expression 29, it is possible to show that a higher w
s
wu increases inequality for
given SU .
